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1 Introduction 
It is recognized that a substantial part of economic action in the developing world takes 
place in the informal sector which hosts unregistered or officially unrecorded activities. 
It follows that the size of informal employment would also be substantial. Agenor 
(1996) and references therein suggest that the share of informal employment may be as 
high as 70-80 per cent in many developing countries. For example in India the 
proportion is a high as 90 per cent when agriculture is considered as a major section of 
the informal sector. The informal sector likely produces goods and services which are 
vertically linked to those in the formal sector, either as finished or semi-finished items 
which compete with those produced in the formal sector as well as purely nontraded 
consumption goods exclusive to this sector.  
‘Informal’ is sometimes interpreted as ‘illegal’. Strictly speaking, officially unrecorded 
transactions are not legal because no taxes or license fees are paid, or because they flout 
existing labour laws by paying lower wages and ignoring the usual fringe benefits paid 
to unionized labour in the organized sector. Then there are also criminal activities, such 
as smuggling, extortion, theft, etc. All of these in a sense are ‘informal’. At the outset of 
this study, we define ‘informal’ as essentially the noncriminal production of goods and 
services that utilizes unorganized workers at a market-determined wage with no 
restrictions on profitable retrenchment. Such a characterization still allows us to focus 
on the economic conditions of the majority of the workforce in a typical developing 
country. 
Deregulation, economic reform and increasing global exposure should have some 
impact on informal activities, wages and employment. The way production is organized 
between the formal and informal segments should also be affected. Unfortunately, 
empirical evidence on the interaction between the formal and informal sectors is quite 
limited and scattered. However, there is a growing literature that deals with the informal 
sector of a relatively open, deregulated developing country. We will trace the literature 
and the questions raised, and then look to substantiate the claims with theory and 
evidence. In doing so, we cannot cover all possible dimensions of the problem, but 
instead we shall attempt to cover a subset of topics. 
Section 2 deals with the issues of reform and informal wages. Is it true that a downsized 
formal segment depresses informal wages by pushing laidoff workers from the formal 
sector into the informal? This is a concern of many who believe that increasing 
competition will lead to unemployment in the formal sector and to sliding wages in the 
informal sector. We look at a generic example from a group of models, which have 
analysed such a problem, and conclude that informal wages and employment can go up 
even when displaced workers crowd into the informal sector.  
Recent papers by Kar and Marjit (2001), Marjit (2002), Marjit, Kar and Sarkar (2004), 
Marjit and Beladi (2002) and Wuyts (2001) provide the building blocks. Empirical 
support for the theoretical conclusions is drawn from the national sample survey (NSS) 
data on informal manufacturing in India collected during various rounds in the pre- and 
post-liberalization periods. 
Sections 3 and 4 both highlight the organization of production and allocation of 
resources between the formal and the informal segments of the same industry. Section 3 
reviews the issue of protection and the size of the informal sector. It refers to the   2
evidence recently analysed in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) for Latin America. Marjit 
and Biswas (2004) provide a formal-informal subcontracting model, to bring in the 
element of monitoring and corruption. In a way, they offer an alternative theoretical 
interpretation that is much simpler than the one proposed by Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2003) and substantiates their empirical finding. Section 3 shows that different types of 
‘liberal’ policies will have offsetting effects on the size of the informal segment. 
Section 4 is based on fieldwork and primary data. We look at the workings of the 
formal-informal segments in the small or cottage-industries of rural West Bengal, a 
province in eastern India. Following its increased exposure to international trade 
essentially through expanding export markets, the nature of the formal/informal 
production structure is undergoing transformation. There is a clear trend showing the 
breakdown of independent entrepreneurship of marginal producers who are becoming 
the tied suppliers to bigger, formal units. This possibly corroborates the famous 
conjecture that the division of labour is determined by the extent of the market. We 
undertake an analysis of the operation, dynamics and organizational change in the rural 
industries of an economy, which has adopted liberal trade and investment policies since 
early 1990s. 
2  Economic reform and informal wage 
This section highlights the impact of typical deregulatory policy on informal wages and 
employment in a small, open developing economy. We have a model consisting of four 
goods. X is produced in the formal sector with organized labour earning a fixed wage w  
and capital. This is an import-competing manufacturing good. Y is an exportable 
manufacturing good produced in the informal sector with labour earning a market-
determined wage  ) ( w w w >  and capital. Z is a nontraded informal good produced using 
labour and capital, and A is the agricultural product produced with informal labour and 
land. Workers must find a job either in the formal or the informal sector. Those who 
cannot be employed at w  move to the informal segment and become absorbed in Y, Z 
or A. Such a ‘full employment’ interpretation of the labour market is consistent with the 
analyses of dual labour markets in the less developed countries (LDCs), as given in 
Carruth and Oswald (1981), Agenor and Montiel (1996), Marjit, Broll and Sengupta 
(2000), Marjit and Beladi (2002), Marjit and Acharyya (2003) and Marjit (2003). We 
have a standard neoclassical general equilibrium set-up where each sector operates 
within competitive markets, constant returns to scale (CRS) and diminishing marginal 
productivity. The following equations constitute competitive equilibrium and the 
full-employment condition symbols used have standard interpretation from Jones (1965; 
1971): 
) 1 ( t P ra a w X KX LX + = +  (1) 
Y KY LY P ra wa = +  (2) 
Z KZ LZ P ra wa = +  (3) 
A TA LA P Ra wa = +  (4)   3
K Z a Y a X a KZ KY KX = + +  (5) 
L A a Z a Y a X a LA LZ LY LX = + + +  (6) 
T A aTA =  (7) 
Z t P D Z Z = Ω + ) ), 1 ( , (  (8) 
We chose  1 = = = A Y X P P P  for this ‘small’ economy; t is the tariff rate; X is the 
imported good, and Y and A are the exported goods.  Z P  is determined internally.  
Given t, (1)–(4) determine r,  Z P w, and R and hence the factor proportions. This also 
determines aggregate factor income ‘Ω’. Then (7) and (8) determine A and Z and (5) 
and (6) determine X and Y. This completes the determination of the general equilibrium.  
Suppose liberal trade policy leads to a decline in t. What will be its implication on 
informal wages and employment? 
A decline in t must reduce r, increase w and reduce R, the rental rate in agriculture. The 
usual output response will be a contraction in X. As  LX a  declines with a rise in w /r, 
formal employment will fall and informal employment will rise. One could trace the full 
general equilibrium implications of a decline in t. This is unnecessary for our purpose. 
A decline in R will increase  TA a  and reduce A, and employment in agriculture and in the 
nontraded sector will rise. 
This is the case where a reduction in formal employment and the subsequent movement 
of displaced workers into the informal segment raises informal wages. The clue to such 
a result is capital mobility. 
For example, if capital cannot move between X and (Y, Z), a drop in t will reduce r, 
displacing workers but not allowing formal sector capital to move into the informal 
segment. This would imply that the capital-labour ratio in the informal sector will fall, 
trading to a drop in w. Several variations of the type of structure have been attempted 
recently in Marjit, Kar and Sarkar (2004), Marjit and Beladi (2002), Kar and Marjit 
(2001), etc. The core result suggests that sufficiently limited capital mobility between 
the formal and informal sectors lends credibility to the conventional wisdom that more 
workers in the informal sector mean lower wages, otherwise not. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide some statistical evidence from the NSS data for nondirectory 
manufacturing enterprises (NDME) in India. This is the typical representative sample of 
the informal sector. Tables 1 and 2 show the increase in real informal wages across the 
states of India over the pre- and post-liberalization period along with the growth of real 
fixed assets. Table 2 also shows the decline in the rate of capital formation in organized 
manufacturing over the sample period. More detailed econometric analysis is available 
in Marjit, Kar and Sarkar (2004). While the overall rate of unemployment, measured in 
terms of organized employment, has not improved during the reform period, the 
informal sector has possibly grown with improved real incomes for the average informal 
worker.   4
One caveat should be relevant here. Real wages of agricultural labourers have 
experienced upswings and downswings, and have declined recently. One needs to 
explore in detail how informal wages for manufacturing and agriculture are actually 
related. Although they should have a positive correlation, there might be a host of 
factors which affects them differently. This should be an important agenda for future 
research. 
Do more flexible labour laws in the formal sector, allowing for the relatively easy ‘hire 
and fire’ strategy, help informal workers? Informal workers in general have no job 
guarantee and wages are likely to absorb the demand/supply shocks of this segment. 
Note that if ‘w ’ is reduced because the effective hiring cost has come down, r should, 
ceteris paribus, go up and w should fall if capital is mobile. If capital is immobile, 
greater employment in the formal sector will also mean higher w, since there will be an 
excess demand for labour and capital cannot move from the informal into the formal 
sector.  
Now, let us turn to the offsetting effects of a decline in t and  w  with or without capital 
mobility. If one assumes immobile capital, trade reform will mean higher w. It will be 
exactly opposite in the case of capital mobility. Such issues are rarely discussed in the 
theoretical literature on economic reforms in a developing country: another area for 
future research. A related question is the issue of rising agricultural productivity or 
agricultural exports and their impact on rural wages, which is easy to check. If capital 
moves freely between the formal and the informal sectors, it creates excess demand for 
rural workers without an accompanying rise in the informal, and hence, rural wages. 
Thus, capital movement plays an important part here as well. We plan to undertake the 
empirical counterpart to this study in the future. Figures 1 and 2 describe the response 
path of informal wages after labour market deregulation and trade liberalization, 
respectively. Capital does not move until time reaches point A and then it moves freely. 
Figure 1 relates w to w for a given t. As w goes down over time, initially with immobile 
capital,  w increases since more people are drawn to the formal sector. As capital 
becomes mobile, the relationship changes, a further drop in w  increases r and reduces 
w. At point A the discontinuity arises because w has to go down once capital leaves the 
informal sector. We repeat the story for a given w  in Figure 2 which relates w and t. It 
is clear that if an economy adopts labour reforms first and then tariff reforms as capital 
becomes mobile, the informal wage is unlikely to fall. However, if capital is reasonably 
mobile to start with, the results will be different. 
3  Vertical link between the formal and informal sectors 
Earlier analyses treat the informal segment as self-contained without any vertical 
relationship to the formal sector. In this sector we consider situations where the informal 
sector supplies an input to the formal sector. If deregulation contracts the formal sector 
by curtailing output and employment, it also hurts the informal segment. Will such a 
policy reduce informal wages? Common sense suggests that this would be the case.  
However, Marjit (2003) argues that when the informal segment contains two 
subsegments—one supplying an input to the formal sector, the other producing a final 
good—informal wages and employment can still rise after an adverse shock in the   5
formal sector. If the segment that is linked vertically with the formal is capital-intensive 
relative to the other segment, informal wages and employment must rise. One example 
that comes to mind is the informal service sector. As capital moves from the 
intermediate-producing subsector to the labour-intensive service sector, wages are likely 
to rise, provided that the service sector is not faced with a demand that is too inelastic. 
This is a theoretical result, awaiting empirical verification. 
More complete empirical evidence on reform and informalization has been collected 
and used in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) who argue that trade liberalization has 
ambiguous effects on the ‘informal’ sector. They show that while there is not much 
evidence of a correlation between trade policy and informality in Brazil, in the case of 
Colombia there is some evidence that liberal trade policies have expanded the informal 
sector. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) use a ‘shirking’ model of labour markets to justify 
their empirical claim. We draw from Marjit and Biswas (2004) in constructing the 
following simple model of formal/informal relationship, with two policy instruments: 
tariff and interest rate. Then we use the evidence from Brazil and Colombia on the 
interest rates. It is shown that while a lower tariff is likely to expand informal 
production, a lower interest rate does exactly the opposite. In the case of Brazil, these 
two effects seem to offset each other. In the Colombian case, the interest rate did not 
drop much, so the tariff effect prevailed. 
Consider a firm in the import-competing sector, having workers at a wage rate w1 in the 
formal sector and w2 in the informal sector, w1> w2. However, producing goods in the 
informal sector implies avoiding labour laws, i.e., avoiding the effectively higher cost of 
production as w1> w2. If apprehended, this would entail some anticipated penalty costs, 
which increase with the size of the informal production. However, there is another 
crucial point. With tariff protection, the firm would gain relative to any other activity. 
Thus, ‘t’ also denotes the margin of benefit for being in a protected sector. In the event 
the firm is caught and penalized it may lose not only its license but also the benefit from 
protection as well. Note that this is equivalent to a situation when the firm is 
apprehended but pays a bribe to escape punishment, in which case the equilibrium bribe 
should be increasing in t. The greater ‘t’ is, the greater the extent of such a loss. The 
firm maximizes the following: 
Max  ) , ( ) 1 )( ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 t L z r L w L w L L f t L L − + + − + + = Π  (9) 
L1 is the employment in the formal sector, L2 in the informal, t is the tariff rate and z(.) 
represents anticipated punishment costs, z1>0, z 11>0, z 12>0,  0 , 0 < ′ ′ > ′ f f.   r is the 
interest rate on working capital, assumed to be the same in both the formal and informal 
sectors. This is not essential for our results. The two policy instruments are t and r, and 
liberalization implies a decline in both t and r.  
First-order conditions yield: 
1 2 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( z r w r w f t + + = + = ′ +  (10) 
Second-order conditions are satisfied (see Figures 3 and 4).   6
In Figure 3, initially L0 is total employment with L10  in the formal and L20 in the 
informal. If t goes down  f t ′ + ) 1 ( shifts down, so is z1 as z12>0. This shows that total 
employment declines, but L20 increases, the informal sector expands. 
It is obvious that a drop in t will reduce aggregate output and employment. But as ‘t’ 
goes down, the anticipated marginal cost of punishment also goes down increasing L20. 
A drop in r will shift both  ) 1 ( 1 r w + down and  ) 1 ( 2 r w + down. But  ) 1 ( 1 r w + will go 
down more than  ) 1 ( 2 r w +  as w1>w2. Total employment will increase as we move down 
along  f t ′ + ) 1 ( line. Therefore, L10
 will increase and L20 will contract. The theoretical 
lesson is that a drop in r reduces the marginal cost in the formal sector more than in the 
informal sector as w1>w2, hence L2 will fall. 
A drop in t and r has offsetting effects. In Table 3, we show that even though tariffs 
have come down in both Brazil and Colombia, the decline in the interest rate is far more 
visible in Brazil. One may entertain a conjecture that we simply have, on the part of 
Brazil, the interplay of offsetting effects with little change in the size of the informal 
sector, but the tariff effect naturally dominates for Colombia. 
4  Export market and production organization in rural formal and informal 
industries 
This section deals with a micro-level analysis of informalization based on primary data 
from rural West Bengal. India started liberalizing its economy in the mid-1980s and 
since 1991 the process has been vigorously stepped up. ‘First generation reforms’ 
emphasized growth by encouraging private sector investment through the reduction of 
taxes, opening up to foreign trade and investment, and promoting other deregulatory 
policies. The Ninth Five Year Plan has emphasized the acceleration of economic growth 
through speeding up the liberalization process and highlighting modernization and 
formalization as a corollary of this growth process by making it more market friendly.  
Now, the questions are: How is the formal-informal reorganization of production 
responding to liberalization policies and to the increasing market exposure, and to what 
extent? What are the characteristics of the formal and informal production organization? 
What are the reasons behind the increasing division of formal-informal production? 
With reference to some manufacturing industries in West Bengal, this section seeks to 
analyse the formal-informal division of production organization resulting from the 
changes in India’s economic policy since the early 1990s: essentially a micro-statistical 
exercise to gain some firsthand experience of the process.
 
Important policy changes have taken place through the opening-up of trade (reduced the 
tariffs and interest rates, etc.) and the rise of financial limits of production units in 
small-scale and cottage industries. In spite of growing competition from large-scale 
industries and multinational corporations (MNCs), these policies have created, to some 
extent, favourable conditions for the development of small-scale and rural industries by 
taking advantage of the added demand from national and overseas markets for crafts 
and aesthetic value-oriented goods (handmade goods). As a consequence units having 
access to sufficient capital and marketing outlets expand at a good pace. On the other 
hand, due to organizational differences and structural backwardness, large sections of   7
other producing units become linked to the mahajan, traders or master enterprises, to 
channel products to the national and overseas markets. 
The division of informal and formal production units arise because of comparative 
production costs in the formal structure, such as wages, and administrative and 
transaction costs. As demand grows, specialization in the production process becomes 
more intensified to match diversified consumer demands. These specialized labourers in 
the manufacturing activities of a workshop or factory should be paid a formal wage rate 
and other amenities according to the Factory Act and other laws; otherwise trade union 
activities become a threat. Thus, these wage costs are saved if the production process 
among the specialized labour is fragmented to the informal sector. 
Current theories of firm organization cannot explain the existence of informal 
production organization (such as subcontracting at a relatively low scale). They 
establish the superiority of a firm over the non-firm organization like the putting-out 
system1 (Coase 1937; Knight 1946; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Williamson, Wachter 
and Harris 1975), but in practice different forms of non-firm organizations have 
developed for reducing transaction costs or for tackling the constraints of organizational 
design. Through subcontracting, master enterprises or traders save administrative as 
well as supervision costs. Moreover, entrepreneurs in rural or remote areas face 
information gaps regarding markets and technology. Thus to bridge these gaps, some 
intermediaries have evolved to gather information on market sources, product design, 
types of product, etc. Artisans with limited capital and traditionally-based skills become 
dependent on these intermediaries for information in exchange for a part of the profits. 
The artisans save the opportunity costs of their working capital. Furthermore, the 
surplus rural masses are forced to search for alternative employment due to the residual 
factor and thus take up small-scale and cottage industries informally at the household 
level (Maiti 2004).  
As markets increase, the scale of operations has to expand, necessitating investment in 
capacity building. Small local entrepreneurs are far more capital constrained than 
businessmen and traders. Therefore, it is natural that the degree of tying-up increases 
with the expansion of the export market. This is related, in a different context, to a paper 
by Marjit and Roychowdhury (2004) which suggests that an expansion of market size 
usually leads to ‘buyouts’ of existing joint ventures. 
4.1  Database and methodology 
Due to limitations on secondary data serving this study, a detailed primary survey was 
needed. The districts of West Bengal have various diverse types of crafts and rural 
industries in the different cultural blocks, regions and villages. No secondary source is 
able to prove actual figures on the industries according to a breakdown of the different 
types at the decentralized level of planning units. Keeping these limitations in mind, the 
                                                 
1    Firms can be perceived as lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk with a long-term 
transaction, the factory owner having a hierarchical system of monitoring resource direction. With a 
price mechanism, a series of transactions are required to decide the true price, while these transaction 
costs are saved within the firm. ‘The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to 
be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism’ (Coase 1937). ‘When a “putting out” system was 
used … inputs were organized largely through market negotiation’ (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).   8
present study has tried to create an appropriate sample design, known as multistage 
stratified random sampling. 
4.2 Sample  design 
The state of West Bengal is chosen purposely because of its significant growth in rural 
industries, crafts heritage and high population density. We use the multistage stratified 
random sampling method to select the sample industrial units. In stage I, the method of 
selection of districts is analysed. In stage II, sample blocks of sample industries from the 
sample districts are drawn, while in stage III, sample villages or a cluster2 of villages 
from each sample block are drawn. In stage IV, sample artisans/units have been selected 
mindful of the respective production organization. 
Stage I: selection of districts and industries 
The districts of West Bengal have different agroclimatic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, crafts heritage, and share of rural manufacturing workers, etc. Four 
districts were selected on the basis of stratified random sampling. Districts are divided 
into two strata, namely by the degree of rural industrial advancement or backwardness 
on the basis of the percentage share of total workers3 engaged in rural manufacturing, 
processing and repairing units (households and other than household industries 
included). A district having more than 8 per cent of its workers in rural industries is 
considered to be relatively advanced; less than 8 per cent would mean the district is 
somewhat backward. This cut-off point was arrived at so that an equal number of 
districts are located above and below this benchmark. Two sample districts are drawn 
from each stratum based on random sampling without replacement. Nadia and 
Midnapore form the advanced strata of the sample districts while Bankura and Purulia 
constitute the backward strata. 
With the help of district-level officers and knowledgeable individuals, we prepared a list 
of units for each district (at the various administrative levels of local governance) 
consisting of two groups of industries, viz. industries common to all sample districts, 
and industries that were specific to a certain district. The common set includes 
industries related to handlooming, wood products, iron and grill factories, brass and bell 
metals, jewellery, etc. On the other hand, industries specific to a particular district 
include clay making and hat weaving of the Nadia district; hornware, mats, and zari in 
the Midnapur district; industries related to conchshell, docra (the traditional 
manufacture of utensils and decorative items in iron, copper, tin, etc.), and terracotta in 
the Bankura district, and lac and chaw works (the manufacture of apparel used in 
traditional chaw dances, usually made of cloth, paper, sand, dyes, mat, tin, etc.) in the 
Purulia district. Two industries from the common group of handicrafts and one district-
specific industry from each sample district were randomly selected. Our selection of 
common handicrafts includes handlooming and the brassware industry while the 
district-specific industries include clay works in Nadia, hornware in Midnapore, 
conchshells in Bankura and lac works in Purulia. 
                                                 
2  Cluster means the combination of a few villages in which a particular type of industrial activity 
dominated. Selection of one particular village could not provide a sizeable number of sample units. 
3  Details from Census (1991).   9
Stage II: selection of blocks 
A list of blocks according to types of industry was prepared for each sample district 
with the help of the local administrative departments, khadi board and responsible 
persons at block level, because not all the blocks in the districts are equally important 
with respective to rural industries. From the list of respective industries, one block is 
randomly selected. Santipur, Krishnanagar and Krisnagang-I are the sample blocks of 
the Nadia district; Tamluk, Mahishadal and Panskura II are the sample blocks of the 
Midnapore district; Bankura districts are represented by Bankura-II and Indpur; while 
the Purulia district is represented by Puncha, Manbazar-I and Balarampur. 
Stage III: selection of village or village cluster 
Not all villages within a block have the same importance with respect to rural industries, 
and one village in our sample lacked the sufficient number of artisans. So, a sample 
village or cluster of villages was randomly selected to represent each industry. Thus, 
from the Nadia district, Phulia is selected for handlooming, Matiari for the brassware 
industry and Dhubulia for the clay industry. From the Midnapur district, Panskura is 
selected for handlooming, Mahishadal for brassware and Baishnabchawk for hornware. 
Kenjakura for handlooming, Mogra for brassware and Hatagram for conchshell are 
included in the sample. Nuagarh is selected for handlooming from the Purulia district, 
as are Gopalnagar for brassware and Balarampur for the lac industry. 
Stage IV: selection of unit or artisan  
First, a list of production unit organizations from every sample village and cluster of 
villages was prepared with the aid of a pilot survey, and then 15 units from each 
production organization were randomly selected, provided they were available. In case 
sufficient numbers were not available, all units willing to respond were included in the 
study. If only one production organization exists in a cluster, 30 units are selected.  
From the above sample design, 356 units or proprietor households, representing 
independent (149 units), tied (162 units) and cooperative (45 units) productional units, 
were selected for detailed survey. The reference period for the study was financial year 
April 2001 to March 2002, that is, one decade after the initiation of the new economic 
policy by the government of India.  
4.3  Method of data collection 
A pilot survey was undertaken to determine the exact number of units operating under 
the different forms of production organization in a sample village or cluster of villages. 
Then, a separate code was given according to the production organization. Consulting 
the random number table, the exact sample unit was drawn. Primary data were collected 
through a survey method or a personal interview with the head of the unit on the basis 
of a specially designed schedule and questionnaire.    10
4.4  Production stages and formal-informal division 
Among the total surveyed units, the following informal characteristics are observed as 
dominant: non-registration,4 non-maintenance of accounts, male domination of 
entrepreneurship, backwardness regarding formal education and training, household 
premises’ units, dependence on other subsidiary activities, caste dominance of industrial 
activities, etc. The survey revealed that several distinct stages are adopted in the 
production process to produce use-value as well as aesthetic value of the industries, but 
these stages vary with the types of products and forms of production organization. Due 
to an extensive division of labour in the production process, specialization increases 
when artisans perform certain phases of the work in their own households or in 
workshops tied to master enterprises and mahajan. Detailed production stages and 
activities of the sample manufacturing industries are shown in Tables 8 to 13.  
Diverse types of technology and human skill are used in the production process across 
rural industries along with traditional techniques. A detailed division of labour is 
established5 more intensively with technological development, irrespective of region. 
Production stages are vertically disintegrated among the producing units. Tied units also 
become specialized in certain types of work: they are assigned a part or the whole task 
by the master artisan or mahajan on a contractual basis where the instruments/tools of 
production are owned/possessed by the craftsmen and the merchant 
capitalist/middleman (located mostly in towns); or the master enterprises may advance 
capital (wage funds and raw materials). The craftsmen make the product according to 
the design and order from the merchant capitalist or master enterprises. The artisans 
may possess the tools and workshops, but they are under tight control from the traders, 
mainly in two ways: proprietor artisans receive raw material from the shops6 of 
mahajans (without any compensation for transport) either in the form of cash or credit. 
When the artisans supply the finished products to these shops or deliver the goods to a 
middleman engaged by the mahajans they exchange instantly or receive credit for the 
value of bani7 and, in some cases, compensation for transport. Second, master 
enterprises or larger independent units also engage these units to produce a part or the 
entire finished item. This can be defined as a subcontracting system.  
A few of the relatively larger units hire more artisans on a daily rate basis. At the 
household production level, both male and female are equally involved in the 
production and household labour, and are unpaid. Workers perform their jobs at the 
workshop or factory and within the household premises. Rural manufacturing activities 
do not necessarily operate only on a small scale; rather these work-phases have been 
transformed to the workshop or factory. But the outsourcing system8 is different from 
the one that existed in Europe during the textile manufacturing phase of capitalist 
development. Obviously, artisans own the means of production, but also bear the losses 
                                                 
4  Kulsheresstha and Singh (2001). 
5  See Jain (1986: 878 and 880-1). 
6  See government of West Bengal (1975). 
7  Bani is the payment received by tied artisans from their master for particular type of manufacturing 
work where raw materials are supplied by the master. 
8  See Singh (1990: 16-25).   11
for damage to production or raw materials. In very few cases, the mahajan or trader 
bears a proportion of the damage. Thus, these units, although seemingly independent, 
are in truth reliant on the merchant capitalists for survival and as such are designated as 
tied units.9  
On the other hand, cooperative artisans are akin to the tied production units, but they 
benefit from the production organization or society in terms of loans, bonuses, training, 
coverage of damages, etc. and enjoy certain democratic rights with regard to the 
production process concerned, according to rules. Whatever surplus is generated in the 
tied units is shared by the merchant capitalist and the proprietor artisans. In a 
cooperative society, a certain ratio of the surplus is expended for administrative, 
managerial and marketing purposes, as the society takes responsibility for marketing the 
items produced by its artisans. 
Hence, it is evident that different forms of production organizations exist in rural 
industries, namely units that are independent, tied, or cooperative. Independent units 
possess their own fixed and working capital, and entrepreneur artisans have control of 
the production process, types of products and marketing channels. Tied units possess 
fixed assets for the product but are largely dependent on the mahajan, contractor, 
middleman or master enterprise for the supply of raw materials. Units with a 
cooperative system also maintain fixed production assets but they are managed by the 
cooperative society, which supplies the main raw materials. Moreover, independent 
units are differentiated in terms of the labour used. Overall, of the independent units, 
51.7 per cent (77 units) operate with the help of unpaid household labour, while 27.5 per 
cent (41 units) operate with hired workers in addition to members of the household. The 
remaining 20.8 per cent (consisting of 31 units) run their production based solely on 
hired help. These are basically directory manufacturing enterprises (DMEs). Strikingly, 
13 per cent of the tied units and 15.6 per cent of the cooperative units utilize hired 
workers to some extent in their activities to supplement household labour. The 
remaining 87 per cent of the tied production units and 84.4 per cent of the cooperatives 
are operated entirely by household members. Looking at all the organizations, 72.0 per 
cent and 19.3 per cent of the units rely on household labour, and jointly household and 
hired labour, respectively. The remaining 8.7 per cent of the units, operating as DMEs, 
are solely reliant on hired labour. One point which should also be noted is that a 
significant share of production units in rural areas are household-dominated, while a 
considerable number of independent units have switched over to factory production, 
which are dependent entirely on hired labour; tied and cooperative units also hire 
labourers. 
4.5 Organizational  change 
During the last ten years, as the result of liberalization (1991-2001), a significant 
organizational change has taken place regarding the division of formal and informal 
production organizations. On the basis of primary information combining all sample 
industries, it can be observed that, out of a fixed set of 356 sample units, the share of 
independent units declined from 44.38 per cent in 1991 to 41.85 per cent in 2001. The 
most significant decline is observed in the case of cooperative units, dropping from 
                                                 
9  See also Banerjee (1994: 19).   12
34.56 per cent to 12.64 per cent during the same period while the share of tied units 
drastically increased from 21.07 per cent to 45.51 per cent. These units have 
transformed from independent to tied or cooperative, from tied to independent or 
cooperative, and from cooperative to independent or tied. Among these transformation 
processes, the tendency of tiedness or subcontracting or the putting out system is 
dominant (Table 16). 
4.6 Marketing  channels 
The essential precondition for growth of an industry, however small, is the demand for 
its products, which in turn is contingent on the behaviour of three types of market: local, 
national and export. While local demand for rural-industry products is insufficient 
because of the low purchasing power of the rural masses, demand in the national and 
export markets is expanding; the markets for products and raw materials have widened. 
For example, in India, the Minerals and Material Trading Corporation (MMTC) 
supplied foreign scrap to local artisans, but after the introduction of the Open General 
License, any individual can import material directly from aboard, and the MMTC 
discontinued its foreign scrap operations. Earlier, artisans were also able to import 
material through the mahajans or master enterprises, but due to paucity of funds, the 
import market was eventually captured by the big merchants and traders. Thus, most 
artisans have become reliant for raw materials on the mahajans, who control prices, 
quality and frequency of supply. The mahajans’ intervention and the artisans’ persistent 
dependence on them has forced them to work on bani (making charge) system. In the 
conchshell, lac and hornware industries, producers in the remote rural areas are directly 
linked to important cities and towns through traders or formal producers. For instance, 
raw material for the conchshell industry comes from the coastal towns of southern India 
and traders from different towns buy and deliver the final product. Some hornware 
industry units transact directly with export merchants or marketing agencies who deal 
with Japan, Germany, etc. Similarly, an upswing in the lac market is totally dependent 
on export markets. The aesthetic value of the products varies across regions and these 
region-specific products have established a trade in the national and international 
markets (for example tangail sharee10  of Phulia; baluchiri sharee of Bankura and 
Bishnupur, lac products from Balarampur; conchshell products from Hatagram; 
hornware from Bishnabchawk; tasar sharee of Nuagargh; musk, particularly for chaw 
dance, from Carida, etc.). Markets are expanding because of the aesthetic appreciation 
of the products and cheap labour costs. A few artisans in the handlooming industries at 
Phulia are engaged in the production for clothing specifically for the Japanese market. 
Brassware artisans in Matiari are engaged in the production of regional products. 
However, traders/mahajans or master enterprises, having fairly good marketing 
channels in the national and export markets, control raw materials and product markets. 
Earlier, cooperatives functioned by organizing the artisans and marketing their products 
through different government and nongovernmental agencies (like Manjusha, Tantuja, 
Bangashree, etc.). Lately, however, these activities have declined in connection with the 
government’s reduction of assistance, grants and incentives to the cooperatives. 
Furthermore, cooperative administrators used to take advantage of the market by 
establishing independent marketing arrangements. Artisans within the cooperative unit 
                                                 
10  Tangail sharee, baluchiri sharee, and tasar sharee are types of cloth intended exclusively for women.   13
are paid long after the delivery of their products, inducing artisans go to the mahajans 
for loans or master enterprises for work, who subsequently control the artisan producers. 
As noted earlier, master enterprises, traders or the mahajan-middleman nexus 
expropriate a large part of the value added. The ultimate surplus to the tied artisans is 
sufficient to cover their subsistence living only, and they are unable to invest more fixed 
capital in increasing the size of their manufacturing unit. Although this 
arrangement/channel at least ensures them subsistence living, they are forced to remain 
in the grip of the master enterprise or mahajan who exploit their skills (see Ray 1991). 
Independent artisans, on the other hand, purchase raw materials from wholesalers 
(either within or outside the district). The petty independent artisans also procure raw 
materials from vendors.  
The major marketing channels include: (i) selling door-to-door; (ii) supplying a fixed 
seller with the final product; (iii) at one’s own sales counter; (iv) through contracts with 
local traders; (v) through trader middlemen; (vi) through contracts with master artisans; 
(vii) through wholesale traders; (viii) through exporter or exporting agency; (ix) via 
their own salesman and advertising; (x) through contracts with cooperative societies; 
(xi) through marketing societies; (xii) at fair or bazaars. 
It has been noted that the small-scale independent artisans, who suffer from a lack of 
working capital and proper marketing knowledge, are restricted to local level markets 
(vendor and local retailer). The higher the capital, the more diversified the market 
channel. While small independent artisans who have no retail outlets of their own can 
sell their products to the wholesalers with better market connections, craftsmen with 
shops can benefit from the diversified market channels by selling their products directly 
to the consumer, the local wholesalers, and even to indigenous merchants. Therefore, 
the formal or directory units have the advantage of diversified marketing channels, 
whereas the small and petty units are forced to rely on local markets. If the artisans wish 
to avail themselves of the external markets, they become tied to master enterprises (the 
formal producers) and traders. Obviously, markets have expanded and consequently the 
process of fragmentation and tiedness has increased. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
This paper is an attempt to outline the various trends in research on the state of the 
informal sector in a reforming developing country. We have discussed the issue of 
reform and informal wages, sequencing of reforms and the vertical relationship between 
the formal and the informal sectors. We argue that deregulation is likely to improve the 
condition of the informal workers, provided that capital is allowed to flow to the 
informal sector and that the informal service sector is supported in the process. As 
export markets expand, the informal rural industries exhibit increasing dynamics of 
tying, technology adoption and growth. This is demonstrated through a firsthand 
field-based survey. Some of our assertions have empirical backup, some are conjectures 
to be tested in our future work. 
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Figure 3 
Increase in informal employment resulting from a decline in tariff rates 
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Figure 4 
Increase in formal employment as a result of a decline in interest rates 
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Figure 5 
Schematic representation of formal and informal marketing channels 
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Figure 6 
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  DH – Delhi  LA – Laska Deep 
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Figure 7 
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Table 1 
Annual growth rates of real informal wage 


















Andhra Pradesh  -14.9383  38.37914  0.351421 5.54216  14.75757 
Assam -12.5909  9.400387 0.502013 19.94701  9.949804
Bihar -12.4796  9.259229 -0.91022  37.41843  15.25582 
Gujarat -8.01461  5.856186 3.761828 9.471879  6.363298
Haryana -15.417  23.39205  -4.11872  33.07289  17.44874 
Himachal Pradesh  -11.5206  -0.34082  3.509483 24.55454  9.241068
Karnataka -12.8237  21.54953  7.021524 13.43834  14.00313 
Kerala -14.8953  12.55645  2.686628 21.20452  12.1492 
Madhya Pradesh  -12.6123  22.41174  1.455013 13.11878  12.32851 
Maharashtra -6.4  9.7482  5.247609 11.28708  8.760962
Orissa  -13.1553 22.78583  -2.38878  33.1919 17.86298 
Punjab -15.1443  12.20414  -1.06954  44.061  18.39853 
Rajasthan -15.4959  32.53101  -1.34439  33.03571  21.40744 
Tamil  Nadu  -10.1074  6.406688 14.13201 11.49062 10.67644 
Tripura -14.3066  14.89337  -5.45877  45.36927  18.26796 
Uttar Pradesh  -13.2014  18.00436  -1.58454  26.79013  14.40332 
West Bengal  -11.2556  11.41085  -7.25447  15.29931  6.485231
Anadaman & Nichobar Islands    14.62978  3.202789 2.910365  6.914311
Chandigarh   19.21098  5.496664 12.4677  12.39178 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli    9.828439 -4.01589  37.7676  14.52672 
Delhi    13.26679 20.39249 12.10498 15.25476 
Laska Deep    -0.21334  9.929694 7.832409  5.849589
Pondicherry   20.77112  -3.96475  -18.5548  -0.58281 
Goa   20.50309  0.947838 23.74566  15.06553 
Jharkhand   20.71262  2.838103 33.64066  19.06379 
Manipur   24.9116  -4.18481  26.83254  15.85311 
Meghalaya   18.91503  -5.28746  33.57459  15.73405 
Mizoram   19.93168  -6.92451  24.69716  12.56811 
Nagaland   15.62657  -1.96228  25.16228  12.94219 
Sikkim   28.81384  -0.01264  42.15758  23.65293 
Source:  NSS reports on unorganized sector in India (various years) and own calculations. 
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Table 2 
Annual growth rate (%) of real fixed capital stocks of formal and real fixed assets of informal sector 



















Andhra Pradesh  15.77  19.77  -3.37    -7.79733  -0.96041  36.85207 
Assam 9.33  2.02  0.46    -6.83476  -4.34561  23.34239 
Bihar -8.0  13.44  -23.06    -16.841  -8.67277  36.85365 
Gujarat -8.0  51.96  22.51    -3.72095  4.870951  13.12233 
Haryana 7.46  4.07  13.82    -2.32648  2.705801  33.10962 
Himachal Pradesh  2.75  5.78  3.56    16.63802  -12.2059  75.32574 
Karnataka 7.92  9.04  28.46    -6.77515  -2.62928  25.51968 
Kerala 5.52  0.52  4.19    -18.8533  -2.29589  50.75252 
Madhya Pradesh  4.17  7.56  -9.0    -6.14669  -2.45067  41.77107 
Maharashtra 11.56  6.26  7.3    0.802123 8.498255  34.05893 
Orissa 33.51  8.49  -9.64    -11.3273  12.10914  13.38253 
Punjab 9.34  4.02  -6.37    -12.2196  -3.63418  26.20876 
Rajasthan 3.31  12.34  10.46    -8.2741  0.421989  52.59911 
Tamil Nadu  15.58  15.06  1.91    -4.03562  3.840182  18.82244 
Tripura 90.03  -8.77  -18.81    -3.16143  -0.00121  40.31617 
Uttar Pradesh  7.59  10.75  -0.79    -7.97152  -0.19041  35.92194 
West Bengal  8.21  14.74  -8.9    -4.83186  -2.76687  53.23383 
Anadaman & Nichobar Islands  29.23  -11.42      -2.26475  95.83243 
Chandigarh   17.0  20.57      32.89912  27.56441 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli    34.27  103.3      -5.6518  141.1057 
Delhi   64.83  -13.28      -3.47284  60.08716 
Pondicherry   34.43  13.71      -15.8524  185.7324 
Goa     4.97  68.22      -8.18683  102.0059 
Jharkhand   3.47  24.63      13.51388  22.21585 
Manipur   408.76  -19.12      3.04875  65.98744 
Meghalaya   -23.89  2.68      15.74781  -9.61401 
Nagaland     24.34  -11.9      -10.6541  115.0085 
Source:   Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation (2000) and NSS (various years). 
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Table 3a 
Comparison of mean tariff for the manufacturing sectors in Brazil and Columbia 
Year Brazil  Columbia 
1984 na  49.8 
1985 na  na 
1986 na  36.6 
1987 58.8  na 
1988 50.1  33.5 
1989 39.1  na 
1990 34.1  29.1 
1991 25.2  na 
1992 19.1  12.9 
1993 14.1  na 
1994 12.9  12.9 
1995 10.9  na 
1996 12.5  13.0 
1997 12.8  na 
1998 15.8  13.1 




Comparison of real and nominal rates (as an alternative for the market interest rate) 
in Brazil and Columbia, 1986-98 
 Brazil    Columbia 
Year  Real Nominal    Real Nominal 
1986  107.2 109.48    31.17 31.4 
1987 395.04  401.33    30.52  30.8 
1988 845.12  859.43    33.24  33.5 
1989 5815.5  5844.98    33.41  33.7 
1990 9390.27  9394.98    36.1  36.4 
1991 903.59  913.47    36.93  37.2 
1992 1533.18  1560.18    36.47  26.7 
1993 3273.0  3293.5    25.56  25.8 
1994 5174.58  5175.24    29.19  29.4 
1995 51.99  52.15    32.1  32.3 
1996  26.38 26.45    31.01 31.2 
1997 24.32  24.35    23.9  24.1 
1998  27.95 28    32.49 32.6 
Note:  As the nominal lending rates were not available for both Brazil and Colombia, we take the 
nominal deposit rates and then calculate the real rates by subtracting the inflation rate from the 
original series. Inflation rate for Colombia has been calculated from the consumer price index 
(CPI). Inflation rate for Brazil has also been calculated from the CPI, except for the years 1990 
and 1991 where the wholesale price index (WPI) is used since CPI was not available. 
Source:   IMF (2002). 
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Table 4 
Socioeconomic characteristics for sample districts, 2001-02 
Nadia Midnapore*  Bankura Purulia 
Area (sq. km)  3,927  14,081  6,882  6,259 
Inhabited village  1,248  10,474  3,565  2,456 
Population (lakh)  46.04  96.39  31.92  25.35 
Density (per sq. km)  981  686  464  405 
% of total state population  5.74  12.02  3.98  3.16 
% of total state land area  4.42  15.87  7.75  7.05 
% of SC population, 1991  29.01  16.34  31.37  19.35 
% of ST population, 1991  2.35  8.28  10.34  19.23 
Net area sown (hectare)**  306.9 (78.6)  859.9 (65.0)  383.3 (55.7)  335.8 (53.9) 
Rural literacy rate  62.32  74.42  62.44  53.82 
Male literacy  68.70  84.76  76.27  72.82 
Female literacy  55.50  63.63  47.92  33.91 
Road length/ (sq. kms)  0.25  0.14  0.16  0.13 
Road density (sq. km/lakh popu.)  942.82  1,699.24  341.47  783.35 
Food-grain productivity (kg/hr.)  2,429  2,305  2,499  1728 
Cropping Intensity  242  164  145  104 
Agriculture wage rate (Rs., male)  56.00  57.48  55.02  47.48 
Rural industrial workers (%), 1991  12.2  9.61  7.23  7.13 
Rural poverty (1993/4)  39.38  38.9  49.77  44.01 
Per capita income (Rs.)  10,654.68  10,252.62  9,849.34  8,809.96 
Note:  *  Midnapore has recently been divided into East Midnapore and West Midnapore. Our sample 
is located in East Midnapore, a relatively well developed area. At the time of the study, data 
for East Midnapore are not available. 
  **  Figures in parentheses indicate the percentage share. 
Source:  Government of West Bengal (2001-02a; 2001-02b). 
 
Table 5 
Number of sample artisans/ units according to sample design 
Stage I  Stage II  Stage III  Stage IV 













selection  Independent Tied Cooperative All 
Handloom Santipur  Fulia  12 15 15  72 
Brassware Krishnagang Matiari  12 15 0  27 
Nadia 
Clay works  Krishnagar-I  Sadhanpara  20 0 0  20 
              
Handloom Nilkunthi  Tamluk-I  15 15 0  30 
Brassware Mahishadal  Ektarpur  3 15 0  18 
Midnapur 
Hornware Panskura-II  Baishnabchawk   12 7 15  34 
              
Handloom Bankura-I  Kenjakura  15 15 15  45 
Brassware Bankura-I  Mogra  0 30 0  30 
Bankura 
Conchshell Indpur  Hatagram  15 15 0  30 
              
Handloom Purulia  Nuagarh  15 15 0  30 
Brassware Manbazar  Gopalnagar  0 20 0  20 
Purulia 









Source: Field  surveys.   25
Table 6 
Number of registered units 
Industry Registered  Not  registered  All 
Handloom, advanced region    22  (30.6)  50  (69.4)  72 (100) 
Handloom,  backward  region   15  (20.0)  60  (80.0)  75  (100) 
Brassware, advanced region    8  (17.8)  37  (82.2)  45 (100) 
Brassware, backward region    0  (0.0)    50  (100.0)    50  (100) 
Clay  works    5 (25.0)    15 (75.0)    20  (100) 
Hornware    7 (20.5)    27 (79.5)    34  (100) 
Conchshell    6 (20.0)    24 (80.0)    30  (100) 
Lac  works    21 (70.0)    9 (30.0)    30  (100) 
     
Total    84 (23.6)    272 (76.4)    356  (100) 
Note:  Figures given in parentheses represent percentage share. 




Number of units maintaining accounts 
Industry  Accounts maintained Not maintained  All 
Handloom, advanced region    20  (27.8)  52 (72.2)   72 (100) 
Handloom, backward region    12  (16.0)    63  (84.0)    75  (100) 
Brassware, advanced region    8  (17.8)  37 (75.2)   45 (100) 
Brassware, backward region    1  (2.0)    49  (98.0)    50  (100) 
Clay works    4  (20.0)    16  (80.0)    20  (100) 
Hornware   7  (20.6)    27  (79.4)    34  (100) 
Conchshell    3 (100.0)  27 (90.0)   30 (100) 
Lac works    25  (83.3)    5  (16.7)    30  (100) 
     
Total    80  (22.5)   276 (77.5)  356 (100) 
Note:  Figures given in parentheses represent percentage share. 
Source: Field  surveys.   26
Table 8 
Production stages of handlooms industry, and nature of machines and labour used 
 
Stages 
Machines & tools 
used 
 
Nature of work 
 
Types of labour 
Mode of 
payment* 
1. Dubbing  Big container  Dubbing the fibre  Unskilled household or hired 
labour 
Daily basis 
2. Drying  —  Drying in sunlight  Unskilled household or hired 
labour 
Daily basis 
3. Rolling, I  Fibre-rolled wheel  Making the rolled cotton 
in catims 
Unskilled Women household 
or contract 
Piece rate 
4. Rolling, II  Weaving wheel  Rolling the cotton on the 
weaving wheel 
Skilled household or hired 
labour 
Piece rate 
5. Weaving  Pincers, rolling stick 
and weaving wheel 
Weaving the fibre  Skilled household or hired 
labour 
Piece rate 
6. Packing  Scissors  Separation, packing  Unskilled household or hired 
labour 
Piece rate 
Note:   * Mode of payment represents mainly hired labour; household labour is mostly unpaid. 










Nature of work 
 
Types of labour 
Mode of 
payment 
1. Clay preparation  —  Pasting clay  Unskilled household 
labour 
— 
2. Container & dice  —  Making & checking the 
container and the dice 
Household skilled 
female or daily labour 
Piece rate 
3. Melting  Furnaces  Melting the old metal or new 
chemical mixture (using 
copper, zinc or tin) 
Skilled household male or 
hired labour 
Piece rate 
4. Shaping/casting  Hammer & 
accessories or 
press machine 
Shaping the melted metal  Skilled household or 
hired labour 
Piece rate 
5. Structuring  Hammer & 
accessories 
Structuring the proper shape 
by removing broken portions 




    designing 
Hammer & 
accessories 
Designing the proper shape 
of utensils 
Skilled household or 
hired labour 
Piece rate 
7. Polishing    Polishing the designed 
products 
Skilled household or 
hired labour 
Piece rate 
Source: Field  surveys.   27
Table 10 
Production stages of clay works, and nature of machines and labour used 
 
Stages 
Machines & tools 
used 
 
Nature of work 
 
Types of labour 
Mode of 
payment 
1. Clay preparation  Spade  Making clay by sand, 
jute fibre, straw 
Unskilled male household 
or hired labour 
Daily basis 
2. Shaping  Structure  Shaping by the 
structure 
Skilled male/female 
household or hired labour 
Daily basis 
3. Designing  Simple tools of 
wooden or bamboo 
blade 
Designing doll or 
structure 
Skilled male/female 
household or hired labour 
Daily basis 
4. Polishing  Dye, brush  Polishing by brush 
with the help of  
dye 
Skilled male/female 
household or hired labour 
Daily basis 
5. Burning  Furnaces  Burning the product  Unskilled male/ female 
household or hired labour 
Daily basis 
6. Designing &      
 polishing 
Dye, brush  Dying and polishing the 
product 
Skilled male/female labour  — 




Production stages of hornware works, and the nature of machines and labour used 
 
Stages 
Machines & tools 
used 
 
Nature of work 
 
Types of labour 
Mode of 
payment 
1. Drawing  Chalk, needle  Drawing on the raw horn to 
design the product 
Skilled male household/ 
hired labour 
Piece rate 
2. Cutting  Scissors and pincers Cutting the horn according 
to the drawing area  
Skilled male household/ 
hired labour 
Piece & daily 
rates 
3. Grinding  Stone or grinder 
machine 
Grinding the raw horn   Skilled male household/ 
hired labour 
Piece & daily 
rates 
4. Bopping  Siris paper, simple 
accessories  
Rubbing the horn  Skilled male household/ 
hired labour 
Piece & daily 
rates 
5. Polishing   Motor  Polishing the horn and 
designing 
Skilled male household/ 
hired labour 
Piece & daily 
rates 
6. Packing  Simple accessories  Packing the final product  Skilled male household/ 
hired labour 
Piece & daily 
rates 
Source: Field  surveys. 
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Table 12 
Production stages of conchshell works, and nature of machines and labour used 
 
Stages 
Machines & tools 
used 
 
Nature of work 
 
Types of labour 
Mode of 
payment 
1. Cutting  Power-operated 
cutting machine  
Cutting raw conchshell 




2. Rubbing, I  Power-operated 
grinding machine, or 
traditional tools, such 
as pincers, scissors, 
hammer, saw, chisel, 
etc. 
Rubbing the outer layers 
of the conchshell 
Skilled male/female, 
household or hired 
labour 
Piece rate 
3. Pasting  Resin, hardner, zinc 
oxide wax 
Pasting the rubbed 
conchshell into required 
shape 
Male/female, household 
or hired labour 
Piece rate 
4. Rubbing, II 
 or  polishing 
Power-operated 
grinding machine, or 
the traditional tools 
Polishing the pasted area  Male/female, household 
or hired labour 
Piece rate 
5. Designing  Grinding machine, 
saw, plane 
Designing the conchshell 
ring artistically 
Male/female, household 
or hired labour 
Piece rate 
Source: Field  surveys. 
 
Table 13 




Machine & tools used 
 
Nature of work 
 
Types of labour 
Mode of 
payment 
1. Grinding and 
   boiling 
Crushing machine, 
soda 
Grinding the raw lac  Household/hired male 
worker 
Daily rate or 
contract 
2. Straining  Crushing machine  Straining the raw lac  Skilled hired male 
worker 
Daily rate or 
contract 
3. Washing  By hand or washing 
machine 
Washing the strained lac  Hired male worker  Daily rate or 
contract 
4. Driving  By hand  Separating the lac  Unskilled female hired 
labour 
Daily rate or 
contract 
4. Melting  By hand or rope  
or ship machine 
Melting lac to make 
bottom 
Skilled male contract 
or hired labour 
Daily rate or 
contract 
5. Bottom making  By hand and rope 
or ship machine 
Producing bottom from 
melted lac 
Skilled male contract 
labour 
Daily rate or 
contract 










Source: Field  surveys.   29
Table 14 
Characteristics of production organizations 
Production organization  Characteristics 
Independent unit  Possesses own fixed capital and working capital; has control over production 
process, types of products, sources of raw materials and marketing 
Tied unit  Possesses own fixed capital, but is controlled by master enterprise or 
contractor, mahajans, middleman who are supplied raw materials 
Unit/artisan under 
cooperative 




Number of units of different production organizations combining all industries 
 Organization 
Strata Independent  Tied  Cooperative  Total 
Solely  on  household  workers   31  (20.8)   0  (0.0)   0  (0.0)   31  (8.7) 
Both household and hired workers    41  (27.5)  21 (13.0)   7 (15.6)   69  (19.3) 
Solely on hired workers    77  (51.7)    141 (87.0)  38 (84.4)    256 (72.0) 
All   149  (100.0)   162 (100.0)  45  (100.0)   356  (100.0) 
Source:   Field surveys. 
 
 Table 16 
Organizational change of industries during 10 years after economic liberalization (1991-2001) 
Organization 1991  2001 
Independent   158  (44.38)   149  (41.85) 
Tied    75 (21.07)    162 (45.51) 
Cooperative      123 (34.56)    45 (12.64) 
    
Total   356  (100.0)   356  (100.0) 
Note:  Figure in parenthesis indicates the per cent. 
Source: Field  surveys. 
 
 